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pessoais:pedro:ler [2007/05/31 18:12]
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 ==== Assuntos ==== ==== Assuntos ====
 spatial equilibrium models spatial equilibrium models
 +ricardian equivalence ("tax now" or "tax later"​)
  
 ==== Papers==== ==== Papers====
- 
-Marietto, M., David, N., Sichman, J. and Coelho, H. 2003. Requirement analysis of agent-based simulation platforms: State of the art and new prospects. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence:​125-141. 
  
 Parker, D., Berger, T. and Manson, S., editors. 2002. Agent-based models of land-use and land-cover change. LUCC Report Series, 6, Indiana University. Parker, D., Berger, T. and Manson, S., editors. 2002. Agent-based models of land-use and land-cover change. LUCC Report Series, 6, Indiana University.
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 Mertens and Lambin, 2000. land cover-change trajectories in southern cameroon. annals of the association of american geographers,​ 93, 467-494. Mertens and Lambin, 2000. land cover-change trajectories in southern cameroon. annals of the association of american geographers,​ 93, 467-494.
 (um modelo economico) (um modelo economico)
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
  
  
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 ===Noncooperative Bargaining and Spatial Competition=== ===Noncooperative Bargaining and Spatial Competition===
-[[|H. Bester, 1989]]+H. Bester, 1989.
 Econometrica Econometrica
  
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 ===The Evolution of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations=== ===The Evolution of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations===
-[[|S. Bowles and H. Gintis, 2003]]+S. Bowles and H. Gintis, 2003
  
 //How do human groups maintain a high level of cooperation despite a low //How do human groups maintain a high level of cooperation despite a low
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 to Nash equilibrium. This research is of interest to computer scientists to Nash equilibrium. This research is of interest to computer scientists
 because modern game theory is a natural framework in which to formally study because modern game theory is a natural framework in which to formally study
-multi-agent systems and distributed computing.//+multi-agent systems and distributed computing.
  
  
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 also briefly considered, as is the extent to which the exact analytic methods ​ also briefly considered, as is the extent to which the exact analytic methods ​
 yield results for simple models in game theory.// yield results for simple models in game theory.//
- 
-===Experiences Creating Three Implementations of the Repast Agent Modeling Toolkit=== 
- 
-[[|M. J. North and N. T. Collier and J. R. Vos]] 
- 
-Many agent-based modeling and simulation researchers and practitioners have  
-called for varying levels of simulation interoperability ranging from shared ​ 
-software architectures to common agent communications languages. These calls have 
-been at least partially answered by several specifications and technologies. In  
-fact, Tanenbaum [1988] has remarked that the "nice thing about standards is that  
-there are so many to choose from." Tanenbaum goes on to say that "if you do not 
-like any of them, you can just wait for next year's model."​ This article does not 
-seek to introduce next year's model. Rather, the goal is to contribute to the  
-larger simulation community the authors'​ accumulated experiences from developing ​ 
-several implementations of an agent-based simulation toolkit. As such, this  
-article focuses on the implementation of simulation architectures rather than 
-agent communications languages. It is hoped that ongoing architecture standards ​ 
-efforts will benefit from this new knowledge and use it to produce architecture ​ 
-standards with increased robustness.//​ 
  
 ===Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining=== ===Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining===
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 for-tat strategy is also compared to pure tit-for-tat and found to be more stable for-tat strategy is also compared to pure tit-for-tat and found to be more stable
 and predominant in perturbed environments.//​ and predominant in perturbed environments.//​
- 
- 
- 
  
 ==== Journals ==== ==== Journals ====
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 ==== Pages ==== ==== Pages ====
-CASA - Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis (http://​www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/​news/​index.htm). 
- 
  
 Program for Evolutionary Dynamics (Harvard University) Program for Evolutionary Dynamics (Harvard University)
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 ==== Authors ==== ==== Authors ====
  
-===Jaime Simão SICHMAN=== 
- 
-Vale uma olhadela no site deste cara. 
-E professor da USP Poli com interfaces com Portugal e Franca e no Brasil na area de 
-Multi-agentes. 
- 
-http://​www.pcs.usp.br/​~jaime/#​projetos 
  
 ===Samuel Bowles=== ===Samuel Bowles===

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